

Final Ukrainian counts announced

http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_11_09/Final-Ukrainian-counts-announced/

Tags: [Ukraine](#), [Elections](#), [News](#), [Politics](#), [News](#), [World](#), [Ukraine](#)

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Photo: RIA Novosti

The final ballot count from Ukraine's latest parliamentary elections gives 188 seats to the governing Party of Regions, 101, to the opposition bloc, 45, to independents, 40, to the UDAR party of boxer Vitaly Klichko, 37, to the ultranationalists, and 32, to the Communists.

The Ukrainian Parliament consists of 450 seats. One half of them is filled by deputies from political parties, and the other half, by deputies from single-mandate constituencies. The Communists are the only party that has failed to win even one single-mandate constituency.

OSCE faults non-transparency, evidence of falsification in post-election report

Nov. 9, 2012, 6:07 p.m. | Brian Bonner

<http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/osce-faults-lack-of-transparency-evidence-of-falsification-in-post-election-report-315884.html?>



Supporters of the Ukrainian political opposition take part in a rally outside the Central Elections Commission building in Kyiv on Nov. 6 Ukraine's opposition parties are protesting alleged election fraud in last month's parliamentary election. (AP Photo/Sergei Chuzavkov) © AFP

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's top election watchdog issued a post-election report on Nov. 9 that exposes more undemocratic features of Ukraine's Oct. 28 parliamentary election.

The assessment is not going to help Ukraine's leaders make the case internationally that the vote, as Prime Minister Mykola Azarov declared, "were the best organized elections in Ukraine in the history of its independence."

In the post-election interim report (a final report is expected later this month), the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights found fault with the vote tabulation, saying it lacked transparency. The election observation mission also found strong evidence of instances in which falsification of election results took place.

Observers assessed negatively the vote-tabulation process in nearly half of district election commissions -- 77 out of 161 observed, according to the report.

"Some 25 DEC [district election commissions] observed by the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission in the days following election day experienced serious problems with tabulating the results in single-mandate districts due to irregularities and other issues, including intimidation of DEC and PEC [precinct election commission] members, interference in the work of DEC, instances of pre-signed PEC protocols, PEC protocols missing pages, and differences in copies of the same PEC protocols," the international organization found.

Moreover, the OSCE/ODIHR "identified cases of preliminary results being changed after they were posted on the CEC website; there are strong indications that some results have been manipulated in favour of certain contestants." Additionally, the report notes that some parties and candidates used gaps in the law "regarding establishing results and the court system as a tool to invalidate PEC results or disrupt the tabulation process at DEC."

With respect to vote-tabulation, the report found: "The main problems reported immediately after election day included DEC [district election commission] premises with insufficient space, overcrowding, tension, and tampering with election materials submitted by PECs [precinct election commissions]. The lengthy processing of PEC results was exacerbated by long breaks announced by some DEC, and by the very high number of PECs that were obliged to compile corrected protocols because of minor mistakes or because the figures in their protocols could not be reconciled. The tabulation process lacked transparency, especially as the room in which the election results were entered into the computer system for transmission to the CEC was, as a rule, not accessible to most DEC members or to proxies, domestic or international observers."

The OSCE/ODIHR mission praised the CEC for posting "election results by polling station on its website; however, some essential data, such as the number of invalid votes or the number of voters who received ballots, were not included."

The CEC has said that falsification in five electoral districts out of 225 should prompt a re-vote in those constituencies, while some opposition leaders -- such as Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms Party leader Vitali Klitschko -- are calling for a new national election because of countrywide fraud.

Others have argued that, no matter the level of falsification, the opposition was still able to garner a strong minority of the 450 seats and hold the ruling pro-presidential Party of Regions to 188 seats, forcing them to seek alliances with other parties and independent parliamentarians.

The OSCE/ODIHR election report also found instances of intimidation of election officials and interference with their work, as well as heavy-handed actions by police.

"Irregularities included intimidation of DEC and PEC members and interference in the work of DECs, often by candidates, proxies, observers or others.⁴ Instances were also observed of pre-signed blank PEC protocols, PEC protocols missing pages, and differences in copies of the same PEC protocols," the report says.

"Cases of DECs reconvening and changing results were observed, as well as power cuts at some DEC premises while tabulation was ongoing. OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs observed the presence of special security forces outside or inside seven DECs, in some cases blocking access to the premises. In Mykolaiv Oblast, special forces entered DEC 132 and seized PEC protocols, following a court order to deliver them to the court."

Vague provisions of the electoral law led to numerous recounts, which were decided by DECs based on contestants' complaints, court decisions and following cases where packages with election materials had illegally been unsealed after they had been delivered to the DEC. In two cases, DECs found during the recount of majoritarian PEC results that a large number of ballots initially counted in favour of leading candidates were found to be marked for more than one candidate and were therefore invalid; they had apparently been tampered with at the DEC premises."

The mission also found two cases in which results were simply changed to declare a different winner in single-mandate races.

"The OSCE/ODIHR EOM noted two cases where changes in the preliminary results posted on the CEC website after 100 per cent of polling stations had been processed resulted in the candidate who had initially come in second winning the seat. This occurred in electoral districts 14 (Vinnytsia Oblast and 132 (Mykolaiv Oblast). According to the CEC, this was due to DECs changing the results after they had already been entered into the system," the OSCE found.

The entire post-election interim report can be found here: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/97077>

Kyiv Post chief editor Brian Bonner can be reached at bonner@kyivpost.com.

Understanding Ukraine's Ultranationalist Support

by Alexander J. Motyl

<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/understanding-ukraines-ultranationalist-support>



What does the ultranationalist “Svoboda” Freedom Party’s 10.5 percent share of the party-list vote in Ukraine’s October 28th parliamentary elections mean? Is it the end of the world? Have Ukrainians embraced fascism and anti-Semitism? Or might there be somewhat less alarmist explanations for Svoboda’s showing?

There are three good explanations—and one shockingly bad one—for Svoboda’s rise from a minor regional party to a very minor national force. After all, let’s not forget that Svoboda received the fewest votes of the five parties that made it into the Parliament.

First, most Ukrainians certainly didn’t vote for Svoboda because they read [its program](#). If they had, they would have noticed that Svoboda’s socioeconomic vision of Ukraine resembles that of the Republican Party for the United States and that its approach to ethnic relations is strikingly similar to official policy in the Baltic states. Nor did Ukrainians vote for Svoboda because they were familiar with its record of governance, which, according to one Lviv-based businessman’s private communication, has been abysmal:

Since 2010, Svoboda has had a majority in the Lviv City Council and is the largest fraction in the Lviv Province Council. I haven’t noticed any important achievements. They wisely choose to stay away from economic issues, preferring to engage in shrill criticism. Their intellectual capacity is weak. Their economic views are naive and primitive, reminiscent of socialism. They’re also corrupt, especially those who came to power recently and had criminal connections in the 1990s. Some businessmen have even been approached by them to pay protection money.

Ukrainians voted for Svoboda because they were fed up: with Regionnaire abuse of them and their culture and with the democratic opposition's fecklessness.

Placing Svoboda in the Parliament promised to put up at least rhetorical barriers to Regionnaire excess. As one Kyivite told me: "The Party of Regions is like the Nazis: they can only be stopped with force." Or, as political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko, [put it](#): "About 30-40 percent of Svoboda's supporters are ideological believers in the idea of Ukrainian nationalism. But in Kyiv and central Ukraine many people voted for Svoboda as the most radical force, as the 'special forces' of the opposition. By the way, many Russian-speaking women voted for Svoboda."

Second, Svoboda would never have made it to the national stage in the absence of the profoundly xenophobic, anti-Ukrainian, and Russian supremacist policies [pursued](#) by the Yanukovich government since early 2010. Regionnaire radicalism thus made the growth of ultranationalist radicalism both possible and inevitable. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that the Regionnaires understood that their policies would benefit the ultranationalists. When President Yanukovich appointed Dmitri Tabachnik, a notorious Ukrainophobe, as minister of education, he had to know he was insulting all Ukrainians. When Yanukovich refused to fire Tabachnik even after a series of firestorms broke out over his anti-Ukrainians remarks, he knew full well that he was rubbing salt into old wounds. When, finally, the Yanukovich regime approved the openly anti-Ukrainian Law on Languages last summer, it understood that it was purposely dividing the country and adding fuel to the ultranationalist fire. Given this record of extremism, it is morally obtuse for critics of Svoboda's xenophobia to refrain from criticizing Regionnaire (as well as Communist) Ukrainophobia.

Third, Ukraine's primarily Russian-speaking, pro-Regionnaire oligarchs have actively supported the Freedom Party. Viewers of Ukrainian television know that for the last few years Svoboda firebrands have been unusually frequent guests on the country's two most popular talk shows moderated by Russian journalists Yevgenii Kiselov and Savik Shuster, both of which are aired on oligarch-funded and regime-friendly television stations. There's also been a nagging rumor that the Regionnaires and some oligarchs have funneled money to Svoboda (a charge Svoboda denies). A reliable source who spoke with a high-ranking government minister two years ago was told the following: "The Party of Regions used to support Svoboda. Then Kolomoisky did and now I don't know who." Kolomoisky, by the way, is Igor Kolomoisky, a Dnipropetrovsk-based oligarch who also happens to be the president of the United Jewish Community of Ukraine. Just why Kolomoisky [stated](#) in 2010 that "Svoboda has clearly moved from ultranationalism closer to the center and has become more moderate" is unclear:

did he believe what he was saying or was he just trying to enhance its respectability as part of some murky game?

Why would the Regionnaires and oligarchs support Svoboda? The logic is simple, if you remember that the deeply unpopular Yanukovich will not be reelected in

2015 if he runs against a credible democratic candidate. The one person he would, as the lesser of two evils, definitely be able to beat is Svoboda's head, Oleh Tyahnybok. Here's the liberal Lviv-based intellectual Taras Voznyak's [analysis](#):

“It's clear that Tyahnybok will not receive 50%-plus-one votes throughout all of Ukraine.... That's why he's safe for Yanukovich. But in order to bring Tyahnybok into the second round of the presidential elections, he must be made, if not the leader, then one of the equally prominent leaders of the opposition. And for that he needs to have a substantive representation in the Parliament.”

According to Voznyak, it's not just Yanukovich who needs Svoboda. It's also the oligarchs:

The existing Ukrainian state is the best possible country for the Ukrainian oligarchate. The oligarchs have done extremely well in this country and they will continue to do so. They can pillage no less well under a blue-and-yellow flag and trident as under a red flag and hammer and sickle; that's not important. It's their country and they really live here, while the people just survive. Hence: no integration into the European Union! No to Russia! Our oligarchs are the greatest supporters of independence: they want to and will pillage Ukraine on their own.

In sum, Svoboda's rise is overwhelmingly due to Ukrainian anger at the Yanukovich regime, anti-Ukrainian Regionnaire radicalism, and Regionnaire-oligarch connivance. It follows that the best antidote to Svoboda is, quite simply, democracy, rule of law, and the free market in general and the dismantling of the Regionnaire “oligarchate” in particular.

Here's a shockingly bad [explanation](#) for Svoboda's rise offered by the Jerusalem Post: “Historically, Ukrainian anti-Semitism is legend for its crudity, ferocity and intrinsicity. The Ukraine's reputation for ongoing racism and ever-virulent intolerance is equally well-earned. Jew-revulsion never quite went out of fashion among broad segments of the population there. So it was not too shocking to learn last week that the extreme nationalist Svoboda (Freedom) party's fortunes had risen dramatically in the recent elections and that it now controls 41 out of the parliament's 450 seats.”

In other words, Ukrainians are “intrinsicly”—that is, innately—anti-Semitic brutes. Needless to say, ascribing “intrinsicly” negative qualities to entire peoples is racist and, as such, no less repugnant than claiming that African-Americans are innately prone to violence, that Jews are innately prone to usury, or that women are innately prone to hysteria. Naturally, if you do believe Ukrainians are savages by birth, there's only one way to keep their “crudity, ferocity and intrinsicity” in check: by violence. And, not illogically, the Post concludes with a backhanded endorsement of Stalinism: “anti-Semitism ... in Ukraine ... is vulgar and in-your-face—as it was before the Soviets temporarily held the genie in the bottle.”

True, totalitarianism can destroy any genie, but suggesting that the Soviets' "temporary" use of genocide, terror, and the Gulag is the appropriate response to a marginal party's marginal success at the polls may be just a tad extreme—and extremist.

Photo Credit: Vasyl Babych

UDAR calls on Europe to apply personal sanctions against parliament election fraudsters

Nov. 9, 2012, 4:15 p.m. | Interfax-Ukraine

<http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/udar-calls-on-europe-to-apply-personal-sanctions-against-parliament-election-fraudsters-315871.html?>



Vitali Klitschko's UDAR Party has said that the authorities should stop exerting pressure on the Central Election Commission (CEC) and that European institutions should apply personal sanctions against the organizers and falsifiers of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine. © AFP

Vitali Klitschko's UDAR Party has said that the authorities should stop exerting pressure on the Central Election Commission (CEC) and that European institutions should apply personal sanctions against the organizers and falsifiers of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine.

"Before we talk about any negotiations, the authorities should stop putting pressure on the CEC, and the CEC should recognize the victory of the opposition in the so-called disputed districts. The Prosecutor General's Office should immediately open criminal cases in connection with the falsification of election documents in a number of districts," the party said in a statement posted on its Web site on Friday.

UDAR also asked European institutions to impose personal sanctions against "the organizers and executors of fraud."

The statement notes that the party will initiate the adoption of laws that will give citizens the right to dismiss officials guilty of corruption or fraud.

Russia Attempts to Strengthen Its Influence in Ukraine through the Nord Stream's Second Pipeline

<http://worldbuzz.blogs.france24.com/article/2012/11/09/russia-attempts-strengthen-its-influence-ukraine-through-nord-streams-0?>

The Nord Stream's second pipeline became operational on October 8th and began streaming natural gas directly from Russia's Yuzhno-Russkoye field to Germany. The pipeline will allow Russia to significantly reduce its dependence on Ukraine, a major energy transit state, strengthening Moscow's political leverage over Kiev.

Since the late 1990s, the revenue from natural gas exports to Europe has been one of the key pillars of Russia's political, economic, and military resurgence. Since the revival of Russian power, one of Russian President Vladimir Putin's top priorities has been drawing Ukraine back into Russia's sphere of influence. Until last year, however, Russia had to depend on Ukraine to transit approximately 80 percent of the natural gas exports to Europe, meaning that Moscow's influence over Kiev was always limited. Moreover, given the frosty relations between the two countries, Ukraine was never truly a reliable business partner. In fact, their price disputes in 2006 and in 2009 led to Russia temporarily halting its supply to Europe.

Nonetheless, after the first pipeline came on last year, Russia's dependence on Ukraine for natural gas transit was reduced by approximately 23%. With the second pipeline operational, the dependence could soon be reduced even further, making Russia a more reliable producer for the Western European consumers. On the other hand, Ukraine will lose a significant amount of transit revenue. While the Nord Stream does not completely negate Ukraine's status as a key transit state for Russian natural gas, the pipeline does give Moscow more political and economic leverage over Kiev than before, since transit fee is the largest source of revenue for Ukraine. Kiev could be more dependent on Russia economically in other ways, while Russia could be less dependent on the former.

Furthermore, the Nord Stream places a heavy psychological pressure on Kiev because of Moscow's current plan to build the South Stream, which would also bypass much of Eastern Europe. The project was announced to be completed by 2015, but it faces several political and economic obstacles and will probably not be completed by the deadline. The South Stream project, however, is a serious future concern for Kiev because Russia would no longer need Ukraine as a transit state if the pipeline is built. In that scenario, Ukraine could suffer further economic setbacks. At the same time, Ukraine faces the prospect of Russia selectively cutting off its energy supply to the former for political reasons. Ukraine imports much of its energy from Russia. Given that the Ukrainian economy, industries, and households depend heavily on Russian energy, Moscow could essentially be holding Kiev a hostage through economic means.

While Russia is already a very powerful player in Ukrainian politics, operation of the Nord Stream's second pipeline signifies that Russia's efforts to increase its leverage over Ukraine have indeed been succeeding. Given that both the European Union and Ukraine lack the means to reduce their energy dependence on Russia in the short term, Moscow's clout in Kiev will only grow stronger for now.

Submitted by Sungtae "Jacky" Park

Sungtae "Jacky" Park a M.A. Security Policy Studies candidate the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs. He has previously published for CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) and The International Affairs Review.

Ukraine starts gas shipments to Europe

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http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/11/09/Ukraine-starts-gas-shipments-to-Europe/UPI-36951352284614/

KIEV, Ukraine, Nov. 9 (UPI) -- Ukraine's state-owned natural gas company secured a deal with Germany's RWE that could weaken Gazprom's grip on the regional energy sector, an executive said.

German energy company RWE is working with Ukraine to get gas through Poland in an effort to break the Russian grip on the regional energy sector. Pavel Afanasiev, a gas director at Ukrainian state-owned energy company Naftogaz, told Argus Media that this is a test run that would last for about two months. "The gas will be delivered to Ukraine through Poland, by reversing one of the few lines that connect the two countries' transmission systems," he was quoted as saying.

Both sides, Afanasiev said, would examine a more comprehensive relationship once the initial phase concludes. RWE, he said, could eventually sell Ukraine as much as 176 billion cubic feet of natural gas.

Gas disputes between Russian energy company Gazprom and Ukraine, most recently in 2009, caused problems for European consumers when supplies were disrupted briefly. Most of the Russian gas headed for Europe runs through a Soviet-era gas transit system in Ukraine.

Europe is seeking to break the Russian grip on the energy sector by courting energy-rich countries in the Caspian region. Moscow, for its part, has expanded its gas export options through the Nord Stream pipeline and the planned South Stream project.

Cash For Demonstrators At Communist Rally In Kyiv

<http://www.rferl.org/media/video/24766477.html>



Published 9 November 2012

Communist Party of Ukraine supporters gathered in Kyiv on November 7 to mark the 95th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. But many in the crowd were not there to show their support for the party, but to make a little money from the organizers, who were paying \$3-\$5 to participants. RFE/RL correspondent Bohdan Krasavtsev took the offer, but returned the money afterward. (Produced by Bohdan Krasavtsev, Dmytro Barkar, and Oksana Andruschak)

Ukraine Bank website(bank.kiev.ua) under DDOS attack

Reported by Sabari Selvan on Friday, November 09, 2012 | 0 comments

<http://www.ehackingnews.com/2012/11/ukraine-bank-site-under-ddos-attack.html>



The anonymous hackers launched Distributed denial of service(DDOS) attack

against Ukraine Bank website(bank.kiev.ua). The attack was announced in twitter by hacker named 'LegionCr3w' .

"bank.kiev.ua/ TANGO DOWN! reason: corruption / election 2012 #OpUkraine"the tweet posted by hacker reads.

"Dear #corrupt #governments out there: We are Anonymous. We are your enemy. We will always fight. We will win. #Anonymous" another tweet reads.

At the time of writing ,we are not able to reach the site and downforeveryoneorjustme reports "It's not just you! <http://www.bank.kiev.ua> looks down from here. "

Besides DDOS attack, He has hacked into one of the Ukraine government website(dabi.gov.ua) few days back. The data stolen from the server was dumped in the pastebin. <http://pastebin.com/D37YwLp2>

Prison service: Tymoshenko again refuses to participate in UESU case trial due to political protest

Nov. 9, 2012, 4:50 p.m. | Interfax-Ukraine

<http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/prison-service-tymoshenko-again-refuses-to-participate-in-uesu-case-trial-due-to-political-protest-315872.html?>



Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has again refused to participate in the hearing of the UESU case in Kharkiv, which is to be held on November 13, the press office of the State Penitentiary Service of Ukraine reported on Friday. © AFP

Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has again refused to participate in the hearing of the UESU case in Kharkiv, which is to be held on November 13, the press office of the State Penitentiary Service of Ukraine reported on Friday.

"Prisoner Tymoshenko wrote a letter to the head of Kachanivska Penal Colony No. 54, in which, in particular, she refers to the fact that she examined a summons to the Kyivsky District Court of Kharkiv to participate in the court hearing on November 13 this year, and refuses to come to court," reads the statement.

Tymoshenko justified her refusal to participate in the hearing by the fact that she is currently in hospital and is in a "state of political protest" [probably referring to her hunger striker in protest against electoral fraud].